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STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Did the Utah State Bar have jurisdiction to hold

disciplinary proceedings on Appellant in F-198?
2.

Is the Utah State Bar's recommendation of

disbarment excessive and inequitable?
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

In Re:
Case No. 870051
JOHN S. DAVIS
Priority No. 4

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal of the recommendation of the Utah
State Bar, by and through its Board of Bar Commissioners,
that Appellant be disbarred.
In November 1982 Appellant was convicted of second
degree felony theft, for which he was sentenced as a third
degree felony.

In March 1983 Appellant was placed on

Interim Suspension, pending completion of disciplinary
action.

In May 1986 a disciplinary trial was held and in

November 1986 the hearing panel issued its Findings,
Conclusions and Recommendations to the Board of Bar
Commissioners, which affirmed them in January 1987.
Since February 5, 1987, those Findings, Conclusions and
Recommendation of Disbarment have been pending in this
court.

It is from that recommendation and underlying

findings that this appeal has been taken by Appellant.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In October 1982 Appellant was convicted by a jury of
Theft, a Second Degree Felony, in the Fourth Judicial
District Court of the State of Utah in and for Utah County
(R. 19)- On November 26, 1982, Judge Don Tibbs entered the
conviction as a Third Degree Felony and placed Appellant on
probation. (R. 14 of F-198)

The conviction was based upon

evidence that in 1979 Appellant diverted to his own use
approximately $73,279.45 that belonged to his clients,
Charley Joseph and Joseph Mascaro, who were investment
partners in a real estate venture. (R. 13 of F-198)

In 1980

Appellant was sued by Mascaro and another to recover their
share of the $141,037.09 paid by Chatillon, Inc., to
Appellant, who received the money as attorney for the
investment partnership and who had diverted and spent the
bulk of it as his own. (R. 09 of F-198)
In connection with that litigation Appellant was
deposed in June 1981 and stated under oath that he was still
holding the money received from Chatillon in his trust
account, whose location he refused to disclose. (R. 09 of
F-198, Exhibit 5)

Eventually the civil trial court ordered

disclosure of Appellant's bank records.

Contrary to what

Appellant had represented, the funds received from Chatillon
had been fully exhausted. (R. 09 of F-198) (For greater
detail of these facts that underlie the criminal conduct and
the civil action, see a copy of the 1984 Utah Supreme Court
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decision affirming the criminal conviction and a subsequent
related appeal attached as Addendum A.)
Contemporaneous with the criminal action was a
complaint filed with the Utah State Bar by Charley Joseph in
January 1982. (R. 98 of F-137) The ensuing Bar complaint
alleged illegal conduct involving moral turpitude [DR
1-102(A)(3)] and misconduct in failing to pay a client
monies held by Appellant and requested by the client and
failing to properly account for client funds [DR
9-102(B)(3&4)]. (R.96 of F-137) (See Addendum B)
A Screening Panel of the Ethics and Discipline
Committee determined that a Formal Complaint should issue
and F-137 was filed (R. 10 of F-137)(Addendum C), alleging
violations of Rule III and Rule IV of the Procedures of
Discipline (See Addendum D for pertinent Rules) and
subsections (5) and (6) of DR 1-102(A), in addition to those
previously alleged. (See Addendum D for pertinent Rule and
DR violations)
On motion of the Bar Counsel, for the Ethics and
Discipline Committee and the Board of Bar Commissioners,
Appellant was placed in Interim Suspension by this court
March 7, 1983. (R. 29 of F-137)
Subsequently in January 1984, Bar Counsel was permitted
to file an Amended Complaint (R. 35 of F-137)(Addendum E ) ,
which left the original allegations of F-137 as Count I, but
as a result of Appellant's criminal conviction, added Count
II, alleging Appellant had now violated Rule II, Section 4
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and Canon 1, DR 1-102(A)(4) of the Revised Rules of
Professional Conduct, Rule 11(a) of the Procedures of
Discipline, and Rule C, paragraph 23 of the Rules for
Integration and Management of the Utah State Bar. (See
Addendum F for Integration Rule)
Pursuant to a January 31, 1985, Order of Hearing Panel
Chairman Gerald Kinghorn, Bar Counsel referred Count II of
Amended F-137 to a Screening Panel for its consideration, as
the Ethics and Discipline Committee had not reviewed those
allegations before they were added to F-137. (R. 150 of
F-137)(See Addendum G)

A Formal Complaint was voted by the

Ethics and Discipline Committee and it was issued as F-190.
On stipulation of Appellant and Bar Counsel, F-190 was
dismissed without prejudice in April 1985 (R. 27-28 of
F-198)(Addendum H) and reissued in proper form as F-198,
still alleging only violations related to Appellant's
criminal conviction. (R. 24 of F-198)(Addendum I)
As a result of the January 31, 1985, Order, the Hearing
Panel dismissed Count II of Amended F-137 and granted Bar
Counsel's Motion to Consolidate F-137 with F-198, as F-198
alleged the misconduct formerly contained in Count II of
Amended F-137. (R. 161, 164 of F-198)
Approximately one month prior to the disciplinary trial
of May 15, 1986, Bar Counsel dismissed Count I of F-137, the
only remaining count in that Formal Complaint. (R. 231 of
F-137) On November 18, 1986, the Disciplinary Hearing Panel
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entered its Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation of
Disbarment over the signatures of its three members, Gerald
H. Kinghorn, Randon W. Wilson, and E. Allan Hunter. (R. 267
of F-137)(Addendum J)
Subsequently the Board of Bar Commissioners affirmed
and adopted those Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations,
which were filed February 5, 1987, with this court. (R. 272
of F-137)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Utah State Bar did have jurisdiction over Appellant
in F-198.

This court's Order of Interim Suspension did not

act as a bar to any subsequent disciplinary action against
Appellant.
Rule 41(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is not
sound authority for Appellant's proposition that
jurisdiction over him was lost by prior dismissals of
similar allegations.

The rules of evidence and procedure

applicable to the conduct of non-jury civil trials apply
only to the actual hearing on the Formal Complaint, not to
all stages of the proceeding.

Therefore, a disciplinary

trial is a unique entity, not suited by its purpose to be
perfectly analogous to civil trials.
The recommendation of disbarment is not excessive under
the facts of this case and Appellant ought not receive
benefit of any retroactivity of the sanction.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE UTAH STATE BAR HAD JURISDICTION OVER APPELLANT
WHEN F-198 WAS ISSUED.
In 1985 Rule 111(g) of the Procedures of Discipline of
the Utah State Bar defined "member of the Bar' as "an
attorney in good standing on the official roster of
attorneys of the Supreme Court of Utah and the Utah State
Bar,"

Rule VIII(a) provided then and now that "a

disciplinary proceeding may be initiated against any member
of the bar."

Clearly the intent of Rule VIII is not served

by the interpretation of these rules urged by Appellant,
that he is immune from bar prosecution because he was not "a
member in good standing" by dint of his interim suspension
status.
In any event Appellant misconstrues Rule
VII(b).

(Addendum K) That section is a description of the

sanction of suspension that is the culmination of a
discipline proceeding against an attorney, where a
Disciplinary Hearing Panel and the Board of Bar
Commissioners have considered the matter and have made
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommendations of
Discipline.

The sanction of suspension, which may be for

any period not to exceed two years, can only be ordered by
the Utah Supreme Court after it has reviewed the record
pursuant to Rules XIII and XIV of the Procedures of
Discipline.
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Interim Suspension, defined in Rule VII(b)(l-5), is a
different kind of suspension.

It is not a subset of the

Suspension described in VII(b) but a unique status which may
be order before the disciplinary process is concluded, prior
to consideration of the misconduct by the Screening Panel of
the Ethics and Discipline Committee or a Disciplinary
Hearing Panel.
A suspension under VII(b) can be stayed by the court
but interim suspension under VII(b) cannot.

It is a

mechanism to swiftly remove an attorney from the practice of
law in order to protect the public prior to imposition of a
sanction, which may or may not ultimately be suspension.
(Temporary conditions of probation are also authorized by
this section if such are needed to protect the public during
the pendency of the disciplinary action.)

The language of

VII(b)(l) contemplates that such petitions may be prior to,
concurrent with, or subsequent to the filing of Findings,
Conclusions, and a Recommendation of Discipline with the
court.
Consequently Appellant's reliance of his lack of good
standing to fend off the imposition of a sanction by this
court is misplaced.

His interim suspension was merely his

removal from the practice of law during the course of the
disciplinary process; it was not a disciplinary sanction.
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POINT II
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH STATE BAR WAS NOT LOST BY
THE PRIOR DISMISSALS OF THE ALLEGATIONS OF
APPELLANT'S CRIMINAL CONVICTION.
Appellant claims that the Utah State Bar no longer has
jurisdiction to prosecute him for his felony conviction
because similar action against Appellant had previously been
voluntarily dismissed.

Appellant is wrong.

Count II of

F-137 was dismissed by the Disciplinary Hearing Panel (R.
161 of F-198), not by Bar Counsel, although he had filed a
Motion to Dismiss.

The Panel's Order was in response to

Appellant's motion to strike that allegation as he had not
had it considered by a Screening Panel and it was improperly
included in the Formal Complaint.

F-190 was expressly

dismissed upon stipulation of the parties "without
prejudice" so that Bar Counsel could return the matter to a
Screening Panel for a proper determination. (See Addendum I)
This factual dispute aside, Appellant misapplies Rule
XII(b) of the Procedures of Discipline by attempting to
extend it beyond its defined limits —
Formal Complaint." (Addendum L)

the "hearing on a

Pre-trial motions and the

significance thereof are not part of the hearing, which is
the actual disciplinary trial and which is the only
disciplinary procedure that must be reported electronically
or stenographically.

Rule XII(b) gives notice to the

parties and the Disciplinary Hearing Panel of the character
of the proceeding and the rules that will govern
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admissibility of evidence.

For example it puts an accused

attorney on notice that he may be called to testify by the
prosecutor, a procedure impermissible if the Rules of
Criminal Procedure were followed.
Appellant's argument is flawed because he has a
fundamental misunderstanding of the purpose of the attorney
discipline process. The goal is not winning.

The

objectives are to protect the public and to ensure the
integrity of the profession.

Rule 1(a) of the Procedures of

Discipline states it thusly:
"The purpose of the attorney disciplinary proceedings
is to ensure and maintain the high standard of professional
conduct required of those who undertake the discharge of
professional responsibilities as members of the Utah State
Bar, and to protect the public and the administration of
justice from those who have demonstrated by their conduct
that they are unable or likely to be unable to properly
discharge their public trust as attorneys and counselors."
Rule 1(c) also makes it clear that "the rules are to be
construed so as to achieve the spirit of professional
discipline of the Utah State Bar, and to effect substantial
justice and fairness."

These objectives would be undermined

by Appellant's technical argument, and the interest of
justice ill-served by a finding that a convicted thief could
hereby escape accountability to his profession.
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In Re Strong, 616 P.2d 583, 585 (Utah 1980) set forth
the unique nature of the disciplinary proceedings:

"Thus,

the preservation of the integrity of the courts and the
safety of the public must rise above the strict technical
rules of evidence that govern the usual adversary
proceedings between individuals.

This is not a proceeding

to determine conflicting claims of right where one party
prevails over the other."
POINT III
THE RECOMMENDATION OF DISBARMENT IS APPROPRIATE.
Appellant argues that because he has been on interim
suspension for four years that disbarment would be unduly
harsh.

He correctly claims that a minimum of nine years

will have to have passed from the date of his interim
suspension before he can apply for readmission.

While it

may be true that in some circumstances such a sanction would
be excessive, this is not such a case.
Appellant has been convicted of felony theft, a crime
of moral turpitude.

See In Re Pearce, 136 P.2d 969, 971

(Utah 1943); In the Matter of Charles W. Colson, 412 A.2d
1160, 1168 (1979); In Re Alvin E. Honoroff, 126 Cal. Rptr.
229, 543 P.2d 597 (1975).

He stole approximately $73,000

from his clients, an action that is particularly repugnant
because it shattered a bond of professional and fiduciary
trust.

Then he lied under oath about the preservation of

that money in trust accounts, further evidence of his lack
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of moral fitness to practice law. (See Statement of Facts)
Appellant produced no mitigation for the Disciplinary Panel.
In In Re James Murrell Jones, 696 P.2d 1215 (Utah 1985)
this court disbarred an attorney for his conviction of two
counts of felony theft by deception, where no evidence in
mitigation was presented or found.

In a concurring opinion

Associate Chief Justice I. Daniel Stewart expressed his view
and that of Justice Zimmerman that the automatic disbarment
authorized by Rule 23 of the Rules for Integration and
Management of the Utah State Bar ought to be reserved for
felonies that are malum in se., of which theft by deception
is one.

Even under that restriction, disbarment is the only

appropriate sanction in this case under the circumstances of
Appellant's conviction for felony theft.
While delay in this matter was regrettable, it was
occasioned both by the actions of Bar Counsel and of
Appellant, who filed numerous motions throughout these
proceedings, including, but not limited to, motions to hold
in abeyance, motions to extend the time for discovery, and a
petition for an interlocutory appeal. (R. 74, R. 168 and R.
194 of F-137) Given the egregiousness of Appellant's
conduct, the interests of the public, the profession, and
justice would not be served by allowing Appellant any
consideration now for his period of interim suspension.
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CONCLUSION
Appellant has attempted to distort the Procedures of
Discipline and obscure their logical, clear meaning and
application.

He has received every consideration during the

discipline process, as attested by the voluminous record,
and now ought to be fully accountable for his misconduct.
Respondent urges the court to accept the Recommendation
of the Board of Bar Commissioners that Appellant be
disbarred and his name stricken from the roster of
attorneys.

Respectfully submitted this

A " ^ day of October,

1987.

Jo/Carol Nesset-Sale
tto
Attorney
for Respondent
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I, Jo Carol Nesset-Sale, hereby certify that four true
and exact copies of the foregoing Brief were mailed, postage
pre-paid, to John S. Davis, 1068 North Grand Circle, Provo,
Utah

84604, this

Delivered by

/b

day of October, 1987.

/^yCj^j^^/T"^'Av^LO

day of October , 1987/
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
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D
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*
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^°*

NoaJl T. WooLto.
tor R e s p o n d e n t

State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.

John Shepard Davis,
Defendant and Appellant*

HALL, Chief Justice:

No. 18892
F I L E D
J u n e 2 5 , 1984

Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk
Ronald R. Stange
for Appellanc

This1is an appeal from a third degree felony conviction of theft.
Defendant assigns the following as error:
(1)' insufficiency of the evidence; (2) denial of his motion to
waive a jury trial; (3) admission of improper evidence during
the State's rebuttal argument; and (4) inclusion of a partial
written deposition in the evidence which the jury was permitted
to take with them into their place of deliberation.
In 1978, Joseph Mascaro and Charley Joseph became
investment partners for the purpose of purchasing options on two
adjacent parcels of real property located in"Utah County. While
holding said options, Mascaro and Joseph (hereinafter the
"partnership11) initiated a sale of both parcels to Paul Tanner,
who intended to develop the lots into a subdivision. Prior to
the consummation of that sale, however, the term of the options
expired and Tanner was able to negotiate a direct purchase on
the larger of the two parcels (consisting of approximately 130
acres) from Stan Logan, the former owner thereof. The partnership was able to renew its option on the smaller 18-acre parcel,
which it then exercised by purchasing the said parcel on uniform
real estate contract for $117,000. Inasmuch as this smaller
parcel provided access to the larger parcel purchased by Tanner,
it was essential to Tanner's proposed development. Tanner
therefore purchased the smaller parcel from the partnership on,
uniform real estate contract at a price of 3165,000. He paid
340,000 down on the contract, but was unable thereafter to
obtain the necessary financing to pay off the 3125,000 balance.
In December of 1978, defendant John Davis, an attorney, was hired by the partnership to collect the balance owing
l.:eIn violation of U.C.A., 1953, § 76-6-404. . _ _-2.. the. 340,000 received from Tanner was disbursed by* the"
partnership as follows: 333,000 was paid as a down payment on
the partnership's contract to purchase the 18-acre parcel;
34,000 was paid to the real estate company handling the transaction; and the remaining 33,000 was split equally between

on the Tanner contract. During the initial meeting between
defendant and the partnership, one of the matters discussed
relative to the impending collection was that of attorney
fees. Defendant indicated that his fee for the requested
services would be between $9,000 and S12,000, depending upon the
extent of the work involved. The partnership, however, countered with an offer of a flat fee of $20,000 to cover the
collection as well as defendant's representation of the partnership in any connected litigation. The record does not reveal
which fee proposal was ultimately agreed upon.
Defendant was successful in negotiating a settlement
between the partnership and Tanner, whereby Tanner agreed to
sell his interest in both parcels if the partnership could find
another buyer before Tanner could obtain financing. This
settlement agreement was reduced to writing and signed by the
parties (i.e., Mascaro, Joseph and Tanner) on February 8, 1979.
Soon thereafter, defendant was commissioned by the partnership
to effectuate the resale of the property. According to the
testimony of Charley Joseph, defendant was to be paid an additional $20,000 if he was successful in finding a new buyer and
completing the resale transaction. That testimony was however
contradicted by defendant, who testified that he had agreed to
perform the said services in exchange for one-third of the total
income derived from the transaction. The record does not contain any written documentation evidencing the parties1 intentions with respect to attorney fees.
Less than a month and a half after the signing of the
settlement agreement, defendant succeeded in negotiating a new
sale of the subject property (both parcels) to Chatillion, Inc.
(hereinafter "Chatillion") at a total price of $1,280,000.
Since the said property consisted of two distinct parcels owned
by different individuals (i.e., a 130-acre parcel owned by Stan
Logan and an 18-acre parcel owned by the partnership), the sale
was accomplished by executing a separate earnest money agreement between Chatillion and each of the owners. The agreement
relevant to these proceedings is that between Chatillion and
the partnership concerning the 18-acre parcel. That agreement
provided that Chatillion would pay the partnership approximately
$1.41,000 in cash and transfer to it property valued at $240,000.
A closing was held on June 5, 1979, at which time
Curtis Baum, Chatillion's principal officer and stockholder,
tendered to the partnership a check for $100,000, as well as
the deeds to eight building lots. The check was made payable
to defendant in his capacity as attorney for the partnership
and was deposited by defendant in his trust account, ~a~s _p.er the
directions of Charley Joseph. The building lots were rejected
:
b-y the partnership because they were of insufficient "value". As.
Tl The cash balance of S41,000 was to be paid within the
following _w_eek. As will be shown infra, said payment was made
in full, though perhaps not within the week after the closing.

a result, Baum tendered deeds to another eight lots, but faile^
to deliver therewith an appraisal to substantiate their value.
At trial Joseph testified that at the time the initial
funds were received from Chatillion and deposited, he gave defendant specific instructions regarding the disbursement thereof. Those instructions were as follows: (1) Joseph was to
receive, and did receive on that particular occasion, a check
for 320,000 to cover his expenses; (2) $30,000 to 340,000 was
to be applied toward the partnership's purchase of the 18-acre
parcel from Shelby Taylor (original owner of the said parcel);
(3) $25,000 to $30,000 was to b-e disbursed to Joseph Mascaro as
his partnership share; and (4) an unspecified amount was to be
reserved to cover closing expenses.
Also testifying in regard to the disbursement instructions was Curtis Baum, who claimed to have been present at the
time the $100,000 was deposited by defendant and to have been
privy to the conversations between defendant and Joseph concerning the appropriation of that money. His recollection of
the instructions given defendant was identical to that given by
Joseph (in his trial testimony), with only one exception: he
thought he recalled the amount set aside for Mascaro as being
$20,000 to $25,000, rather than $25,000 to $30,000.
Another witness who claimed to have been privy to the
subject conversation between defendant and Joseph was George
Robinson, an employee of the defendant's on the occasion so
specified. Robinson's testimony in this respect was consistent
with Joseph's in nearly every respect, the only variation being
that he did not recall a specific dollar amount committed to
Shelby Taylor; rather, he thought the instruction with respect
to the Taylor obligation was that an unspecified amount (of the
deposited funds) should be used to make a down payment on an
apartment complex that would then be conveyed to Taylor in
satisfaction of the partnership's obligation to him.
Defendant's version of the instructions given him as
to the disbursement of the $100,000 was at variance with that
adduced by the plaintiff through the testimonies of Joseph,
Baum and _Robinson, supra. He testified that Joseph's instructions were to apply the funds toward the retainer (i.e., allegedly a one-third contingency fee) and use them- as needed at
his (defendant's) own discretion.
Bank records produced at trial revealed that on June 5,
1979, prior to the recording of the $100,000 deposit,, defendant's trust account registered an overdraft "of *$14\23. On
June 18, 1979, less than two weeks after the'said deposit was
made, defendant's trust account registered an overdraft of"
$435.67. During that two-week period, only $25,903.64 from
defendant's trust account was expended in connection with his
TI Appraisals were to be delivered within a few days.
record does not show whether said delivery took place.

The

work for the partnership;
personal expenses.

the balance was spent on defendant's

Over the period between June 25, 1979, and September
1979, defendant received and deposited in his trust account on
behalf of the partnership additional payments from Chatillion
totalling 341,037.09. Of this amount only 321,854 was expended
in connection with business of the partnership.
Thus, of the
total $141,037.09 received from Chatillion and deposited into
defendant's trust account, only $47,757.64 was spent in furtherance of-partnership business, leaving a difference of
393,279.45.
Despite Chatillion1s satisfaction of the cash obligation on the 13-acre purchase, the sale of that parcel was
never fully consummated because an agreement was never reached
in respect to the value of the lots tendered by Chatillion.
5. The 325,903.64 figure was calculated on the basis of tne
following stipulated expenditures: (1) a 320,000 payment to
Charley Joseph; (2) a $903.64 payment to Bitner Excavating in
satisfaction of a debt owed by Joseph; and (3). a 35,000 payment
to defendant's employee, George Robinson, for-work done for the
partnership.
6. The parties further stipulated that defendant's personal
expenditures from the 31.00,000 included, inter alia, the
following: (1) payment of $1,753.27 to Jones Paint & Glass for
installation of a window at defendant's residence; (2) payment
of $26,644.23 to Thorn, Inc., for accounts previously collected
on behalf of Thorn, Inc.; (3) payment of $6,920 to L. Flake
Rogers for back rent on defendant's office; (4) payment of
34,183.20 to Deseret Federal Savings for payments in arrears on
defendant's home; (5) payment of 33,119.70 to M. Dayle Jeffs,
an attorney, in settlement of a 1977 default judgment against
defendant for unpaid credit card debts; (6) payment ol_S9,125
to F.M.A. Leasing for the lease of a 1974 vehicle and a
Burroughs computer; (7) payment of $4,713.75 to Burroughs
Corporation for updating the memory of defendant's computer;
(8) paym.ent of 36,530 to Provo 27th Ward as a charitable contribution; (9) payment of 31,432.46 to Meredith & Day on a
student loan debt; (10) payment of 32,392.72 to Service Station
Supply,- Ine-* , for accounts collected on its behalf; and (11)
payment of 31,325.81 to Utah Office Supply for accounts
collected on its behalf.
7. It was stipulated that the $21,854 was spent as follows:
(1) 318,000 was paid to Charley Joseph; (2) 32,500 was paid to
George Robinson for work he performed for the part-nership,
(3) 31,000 was paid to Mountainland Realty; (-4) $350-was paid
to Aspen Engineering; and (5) $4 was paid to the Salt Lake
County Recorder.
8. 'The State acknowledged defendant's possible entitlement to
a S20,000 fee pursuant to the flat fee arrangement described at
trial by Joseph and, therefore, charged defendant with the
theft of only $73,279.45 rather than the full 393,279.45.

Also contributing to the failure to bring the sale to completion was the dispute that arose between the partners, Mascaro
and Joseph, in November, 1979. The apparent cause of that dispute was that Mascaro had never received his share of the money
paid by Chatillion. As a result, Mascaro, along with Shelby
Taylor, who likewise had never received a payment out of the
said funds, obtained other counsel and in May of 1980 brought
suit to recover the sums allegedly owed them, naming as defendants Charley Joseph, Chatillion, Inc. (Baum), and the defendant herein, John Davis. Defendant represented himself and
Joseph in that action. However, he did not file an answer to
the complaint, and consequently a default judgment was entered
against them. He then succeeded in getting the judgment set
aside and .was ordered to respond to the complaint within thirty
days. Again, he failed to respond, and a second default judgment was entered. The trial court subsequently ordered defendant to withdraw as counsel because he was to be called as a
witness by the plaintiffs (Mascaro and Brown).
On June 18, 1981, after the second default judgment
had been entered against Davis (defendant) and Charley Joseph,
Joseph Rust, attorney for plaintiffs Taylor and Mascaro, deposed
defendant in connection with the continuing litigation between
Rust's clients, and Chatillion. At that deposition, defendant
represented that he was still holding the monies received from
Chatillion in his trust account; but refused to reveal "the
location of the trust account.
After the deposition, Charley
Joseph, who had been present and had heard defendant make the
foregoing representation, inquired of defendant as to where he
was holding the money. Defendant purportedly replied that he
had the money but did not have to tell anyone where it was.
Joseph subsequently filed a cross-claim against
defendant and, at the suggestion of-counsel, also filed criminal
charges against him for theft. Defendant declined to answer the
cross-claim because, as he later explained at trial, he did not
want to prejudice his case in the present criminal matter. Consequently, Joseph obtained a default judgment against defendant
in the amount of $180,000.
Attorney Rust petitioned the trial court for an order
to require defendant to disclose information concerning his
trust account. Several hearings were held on this matter, and
finally an order was issued that defendant make full disclosure.
As a result, defendant's bank records were obtained and it was
discovered, contrary to what defendant had represented, that
the funds received from Chatillion had been fully exhausted-.
As heretofore indicated, the records also revealed that the
funds had been spent primarily in satisfaction of defendant's
personal expenses.
W. That defendant made this representation was verified at
trial by Joseph Rust, Charley Joseph and Brad Young (the court
reporter who transcribed the deposition), all of whom were

The instant matter proceeded to trial on October 18,
1982. Defendant had made a motion before trial to waive his
right to a jury trial, but his motion had been denied on the
basis of a prosecution objection. The case was therefore tried
before a jury, and defendant was found guilty of theft.1
I.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

Defendant contends that the evidence presented at
trial was insufficient to support his conviction of theft.
Under familiar rules of appellate review, we are constrained to
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's
verdict and will only interfere with or overturn the verdict
when the evidence is so lacking and insubstantial that a reasonable man could not-possibly have reached a verdict beyond a
reasonable doubt.
To sustain a conviction of theft, the evidence must
establish the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
(1) that the defendant obtained or exercised unlawful control
over the-property of another (2) with a purpose to deprive him
thereof.
The underlyingipremise to defendant's claim of insufficient of tSe evidence is.the belief that his testimony provided t.. : only reasonable and truthful account of the events
and circumstances precipitating this action and therefore all
conflicting evidence should have been disbelieved and disregarded by the jury. Overlooked in this premise is the fundamental rule that the prerogative to judge the credibility of
witnesses and evidence in general belongs to the jury. In
State v. Shonka,
where the appellant made a claim similar to
that made herein by defendant, this Court observed:
10. Defendant was sentenced to not more than five years in
the Utah State Prison and fined S5,000. Both the sentence and
fine were stayed, however, and defendant was placed on two
years' probation on condition that he work one day a week for
fifty weeks for the Utah County Sanity Administration and that ,
he make restitution to the victims in the amount determined by
the civil lawsuit on the same matter. Defendant's conviction,
although originally a second degree felony, was reduced at
sentencing to a third degree felony.
11. See State v. Jones, Utah, 657 P.2d 1263 (1982); State v.
Forsyth, Utah, 641 P.2d 1172 (1982); State v. Asay, Utah, 631
P.2d 861 (1981).
12. U.C.A., 1953, § 76-6-404. It is noted that in order for
a
tkeft conviction to be punishable as a secund i-egree felony—
Tas this one was), the requirements of § 76-6-412 must-also be
satisfied. The latter section was satisfied in "this case by
the parties1 stipulation that the value of the property alleged
to have been stolen exceeded $1,000.
13. 3 Utah 2d 124, 279 P.2d 711 (1955).

What the defense argument overlooks is that
the jury was not absolutely bound to believe all of the testimony of the defendant.
It was their prerogative to give it only
such weight as they thought it entitled to
considered in the light of all of the facts
and circumstances surrounding the occurrence, including the self-interest of the
witness.
To establish the first element of the offense, plaintiff had to show (1) that the money received from Chatillion
actually belonged to the partnership, and (2) that defendant
obtained or exercised unlawful control over that money.
As proof that the money belonged to the partnership,
plaintiff offered the following evidence: Curtis 3aumfs testimony indicating his intention to pay the partnership with the
money tendered to defendant and his perception of defendant's
role with respect to the money as that of a mere conduit or
intermediary; the check for $100,000 evidencing defendant's
representative capacity by the fact that it was made payable to
defendant not in a personal capacity, but rather as attorney
for the partnership; and the testimony of both Joseph and the
defendant to the effect that the"money was deposited in
defendant's account at Joseph's direction.
To prove the second half of this element (i.e., the
exercise of unlawful control), plaintiff established first,
through the testimony of Charley Joseph, Curtis Baum and George
Robinson, that defendant received explicit instructions from
Joseph to disburse the money received from Chatillion in the
payment of partnership expenses. Plaintiff then showed that of
the 5141,037.09 ultimately received from Chatillion, only
547,754.64 was disbursed as directed.(i.e., on behalf of partnership expenses), while $93,279.45 was disbursed to satisfy
defendant's personal obligations. Furthermore, plaintiff
pointed out that while $20,000 of the $93,279,45 consumed by
defendant was actually owed defendant by the partnership in
attorney fees, defendant had only received authorization to
take $6,000 toward his fee from the total received from
Chatillion. As to the additional $20,000 offered defendant for
arranging and transacting a new sale after the Tanner default,
plaintiff pointed out that the sale had never been fully consummated and therefore the fee was not owing.
The only evidence offered by defendant to controvert
plaintiff's proof on this first element of the offense was his
own~~l:e¥timo~ny relative to the agreement for attorney fees
and the instructions for the disbursement of the money received
from Chatillion. As heretofore indicated, defendant testified
that he was to receive a one-third contingency fee for his

services subsequent to the Tanner default. Inasmuch as the
sale to Chatillion was worth approximately S381,000 to the
partnership, defendant claimed that his portion was in excess
of 3100,000. He further claimed that the partners had agreed
to take as their portion the real property traded by Chatillion
(valued at 3240,000). Thus, he maintained that the 3100,000
received from Chatillion actually belonged to him.
Even had the jury accepted defendant's representation
as to the fee arrangement, they would not have been justified
in concluding that his appropriation of the money received from
Chatillion as his fee was proper because, as plaintiff pointed
out, defendant never consummated the services for which he was
to receive the alleged contingency fee.
Defendant further testified that the instructions he
received from Joseph relative to the disbursement of the money
were that it should be applied toward defendant's retainer and
used at his own discretion. Based on those instructions, he
claimed that his expenditures were justified and did not constitute an exercise of unauthorized control.
Viewing the foregoing evidence in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict, we believe reasonable minds could
believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the cash* paid by
Chatillion belonged to the partnership and that defendant's
disbursement of that cash to himself for his own purposes constituted unauthorized control.
As to the second element of the offense, to wit:
intent to deprive, it is well-settled that such need not be
proved by direct evidence, but may be inferred from the defendant's acts, conduct, statements or from the circumstances.
According to plaintiff, the most salient evidence in this regard
is as follows: Defendant twice failed to enter responsive
pleadings in the civil action brought against himself, Joseph
and Chatillion by Taylor and Mascaro, apparently to avoid being
compelled to give an accounting of the money deposited in his
trust account. Furthermore, he subsequently represented under
oath at the June 18, 1981 deposition that he was still holding,
the money in his trust account, although bank records established that he had in fact expended the money nearly a full
year earlier. Plaintiff contends that this evidence, combined
with that set forth above relative to defendant's appropriation
of the money, establishes beyond a reasonable doubt defendant's
"intent to deprive."
Again, defendant urges that his testimony at trial
that he honestly believed he was entitled to the money as*his
fee was sufficient to legate plaintiff's evidence (above)
respecting the element of intent. The jury, however, whose
l5"1 State v. Murphy, Utah, 674 P.2d 1220 (1983); State v.
Kennedy, Utah, 616 P.2d 594 (1980).

prerogative it is r veigh such evidence, did
defendant's position, and neither do we.

ot countenance

This is not the first time this Court has found
"intent to deprive'1 under circumstances such as are existing
here. In State v. Shonka, supra, this Court ruled that the
evidence that defendant admitted taking the money, failed to
record it or report it to her supervisors, failed to disburse
it in the proper manner, and refused to permit an audit of her
personal accounts was sufficient to support the jury's finding
of intent to steal. By comparison, in the instant matter,
defendant admittedly appropriated most of the money for his own
use, failed to report such appropriation to the partnership,
failed to follow the disbursement instructions given him by
Joseph and avoided revealing the location of his trust account
and the nature of the expenditures. We hold, as did the Court
in Shonka, that the evidence so stated constitutes a sufficient
factual foundation from which reasonable minds could infer that
defendant took the money with the intent to deprive the
partnership thereof.
II.

RIGHT TO WAIVE A JURY TRIAL

Defendant's second assignment of error is in respect
to the trial court's denial of his motion to waive a jury
trial. He claims that the court's ruling in this_ regard abrogated his constitutional right to an impartial trial.
We do
not agree.
We addressed theginstant issue most recently in the
case of State v. Studham.
We determined therein that the
trial court had not erred in denying the defendant's motion to
waive his jury right. The rationale applied in reaching that
determination is dispositive here:
Although an accused is guaranteed a right
of trial by jury, neither the state nor the
federal constitution guarantees him a right
to "waive" a jury trial. On the contrary,
Federal Rule 23(a), Criminal Procedure, and
its-counterpart, U.C.A., 1953, § 77-3517,
both allow such waiver only by the
Il?n Supra note 13, at 714.
17. Pursuant to the guarantees set forth in Article I,
Section 12 of the Utah Constitution, to wit:
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall
have the right . . . to have a speedy
public trial by an impartial jury of the
county or district in which the offense is
alleged to have been committed . . . .
18. Utah, 655 P.2d 669 (1982).
19. This section provides, in pertinent part:
(c) All felony cases shall be tried by
jury unless the defendant waives a jury in
open court with the approval of the court
and the consent of the orosecution.

court's a ^ roval and the
prosecution*

consent or .ie

In the instant case, neither the court nor the prosecution consented to the proposed waiver. Furthermore, the
record is devoid of any indication that defendant was denied a
fair trial as a result of the case being tried to a jury. We
therefore hold that the trial court's denial of the requested
waiver did not interfere with defendant's constitutional rights.
III.

REBUTTAL EVIDENCE

Defendant next assigns error in the admission of a
written excerpt of his June 18, 1981 deposition as rebuttal
evidence. The circumstances out of which this alleged error
arose are set forth hereafter.
During the presentation of its case-in-chief, plaintiff called upon Charley Joseph to testify concerning a response
given by defendant at his June 13, 1981 deposition (to which
Joseph had been privy) to the question as to whether defendant
still had the money received from Chatillion in his trust
account and, if so, where that account was located. Defendant's
response to that question, as Joseph recalls it, was that the
money was still in the account, but that he did not have to
reveal the location of the account or anything further concerning it.
At that point in the trial proceedings, plaintiff
moved to have the corresponding portion of the written deposition admitted into evidence as an exhibit. The trial court,
however, expressed its view that such an admission would be
duplicative in light of Joseph's testimony; ^hereupon, defendant
made an objection to that effect which was sustained.
During plaintiff's subsequent cross-examination of
defendant, defendant was asked to verify his deposition statement. His initial response was that he did sot recall being
asked the question or having answered it as Joseph had represented. After being shown the deposition to refresh his memory,
he then claimed that he had misunderstood the question at the
time it was asked (i.e., June 18, 1981) and that his answer had.
been clarified at a later deposition taken in September, 1981. x
20.Supra note 18,at 6 7 1 . S e e also State v.Black, Utah,
551 P.2d 518, 520 (1976); Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24
(1965) .
21. The portion of the September 23, 1981 deposition that
purportedly clarified the response in the earlier June deposition was read into the record as follows:
Q. Am I to understand that you did not
understand the question at that time?
A. Well, apparently not. I have since
answered as required by the Court. I
answered regarding the trust account at
that time and I indicated that the trust

Considering defendant's statements on cross-examination with regard to the status of the trust account at the time
the June deposition was taken inconsistent with his representations in that same regard in the deposition, plaintiff called
Brad Young, the court reporter who took the June deposition, as
a rebuttal witness. Young verified the accuracy of the deposition and added his independent recollection of defendant's
statement. At that point, plaintiff again moved to have the
written excerpt from the deposition containing defendant's
statement admitted as an exhibit corroborating Young's rebuttal
testimony* Defendant interposed an objection to its admission
on grounds that it did not constitute a prior inconsistent
statement. The court ruled that it was the equivalent of a
prior inconsistent statement and could be admitted as "an initial question of fact for the jury to determine." Defendant
made no further objection, and the evidence was admitted as
Exhibit P-l.
Defendant contends on appeal that evidence that goes
to "an initial question of fact" can only be presented as part
of the case-in-chief. He did not, however, base his objection
to the admission of Exhibit P-l on those same grounds at trial.
Rat.her, his objection there was limited to the exhibit's admission as a prior inconsistent statement, which basis he apparently
abandons on appeal. Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Evidence
provides:
A verdict or finding shall not be set
aside, nor shall the judgment or decision
based thereon be reversed, by reason of the
erroneous admission of evidence unless (a)
there appears of record objection to the
evidence timely interposed and so stated as
to make clear the specific ground or objection • • • •
(Emphasis added.) In light of this rule, we hold that defendant's present assertion of error in respect to the admission
of Exhibit P-l is precluded.
IV.

THE USE OF DEPOSITIONS IN JURY DELIBERATIONS

Defendant's final assignment of error is in respect
to the trial court's permitting the jury to take Exhibit P-l (a
partial deposition) with them iirto their place of deliberation.
He argues that in so doing, the court violated Rule 17 of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (U.C.A., 1953, S 77-35-17(k))
which provides in pertinent part:
(k) Upon retiring for deliberation,
the jury may take with them the instructions of the court and all exhibits and
papers which have been received as
evidence, except depositions; and each

juror nay also take with him any notes of
the testimony or other proceedings taken
by himself, but none taken by any other
person.
(Emphasis added.)
Plaintifffs rejoinder to this argument is that there
is nothing in the record that even suggests that Exhibit P-l
went with the jury into deliberation and therefore the defendant has failed in his burden of showing error.
In the absence of any indication in the record to the
contrary, we assume that all evidentiary exhibits were sent witn
the jury into deliberation. Such an assumption is appropriate
here. We therefore conclude that error was committed as
assigned by defendant.
Our conclusion in this regard comports with decisional
law in this as well as other jurisdictions. In State v.
Solomon,
this Court held that it was error to permit a portion of a witness's transcript to be taken to the jury room,
reasoning as follows:
It is evident therefore that under the
statutes such written testimony is not to
be read by the jury in the jury room but
is to be read to them in open court, subject to all objections to be made, the
same as if the witness were present and
testifying. The written record thereof
should not be taken to the jury room where
the jury might read it. A written instrument, made an exhibit in the cause but not
consisting of testimony of a witness in
the case, may of course be taken to the
jury room the same as maps, diagrams, and
other exhibits. But the testimony of a
witness is in a different category. Such
is the provision of the statutes and the
common law always excluded depositions and
written testimony from being carried from
the bar by the jury. We can see no reason
why the court should depart from the well
established rule. It may often happen
that the testimony on one side is oral
from witnesses produced before the jury,
while the testimony for the other side on
TT.
96 Utah 500, 87 P.2d 807 (1939). See also State v~.
Wilson, 188 Kan. 67, 360 P.2d 1092 (1961); State v. Payne, 199
Wis. 615, 227 N.W. 258 (1929); Shedden v. Stiles, 121 Ga, 637,
49 S.E. 719 (1905) .

essential matters is in the form of depositions or in the transcript from testimony at a previous hearing. If the hearing
lasts for any length of time and the jury
takes the depositions or transcript to be
read and discussed while the oral evidence
contra has in a measure faded from the
memory of the jurors, it is obvious that
the side sustained by written evidence is
given an undue advantage* The law doe-s
not permit depositions or witnesses to go
to the jury room.
While we are convinced of the commission of the
asserted error, we are unable to find in the record any objection thereto. In the absence of a proper and seasonably
objection, an error such as this will be deemed waived. ~ We
hold, therefore, that defendant's failure to so object precludes assertion of this error.
Affirmed.

WE CONCUR:

I. Daniel Stewart, Justice

Richard C. Howe, Justice

Christine M. Durham, Justice

Dean E. Conder, District Judge
Oaks, Justice, having resigned, does not participate
herein; Conder, District Judge, sat.

~2T. 87 P.2d at 811.
"
~"~~
24. S£e State v. Hofer, 238 Iowa 820, 28 N.W.2d 475, 481
(1947); Proctor v. State, 235 Ga. 720, 221 S.E.2d 556, 558-59
(1975); Shedden v. Stiles, supra note 22; People v. Dixon,
37 111. 2d 416, 226 N.E.2d 608, 610 (1967); State v. Solomon,
supra note 22.
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kind of action is, that the defendant,
upon the circumstances of the case, is
obliged by the ties of natural justice
and equity to refund the money/

The Maryland court continued:
It is stated in Poe on Pleading,
Tiffany Edition, Section 117, in reference to the count for money had and
received: "This count is commonly
said to be equally remedial with a bill
in equity, and, in general terms, lies
whenever the defendant has obtained
possession of money which, in equity,
and good conscience, he ought not to
be allowed to retain." Mr. Poe relied
on Moses v. Macferlan, • supra. See
also Murphey v. Barron, 1 Har. & G.
258. While there was only a special
count in the declaration here, the
facts are set out with sufficient particularity to be treated as a count for
money had and received.
The court analogized its holding to cases
which it cited where a state or one of its
subdivisions had recovered overpayments,
quite independently of any statutory authority. Reliance was also placed on section 46
of the Restatement of Restitution.
In conclusion, the unfortunate and regrettable conclusion reached by the majority need
not be reached. The purpose of unemployment compensation laws is to provide for
workers who become unemployed through no
fault of their own. Unemployment compensation funds are supported by contributions
from employers and taxpayers. It has a
worthy purpose, but that purpose is thwarted
when a worker can refuse to abide by a rule
of the administering department, refuse to
sign a wage assignment after he has drawn
compensation during his weeks of need while
his. grievance was being processed, and the
Department has to sit idly by because it can
do nothing to redress the injustice of double
recovery. The purpose of the statutes is to
compensate the employee for unemployment,
not to unjustly enrich him.
I would sustain the order of the Department, the administrative law judge, and the
Board of Review ordering the plaintiff to
make restitution.
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John Shepard Davis for Defendant and
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PER CURIAM:
This is an appeal from various postconviction orders of the district court, including the denial of a motion for a new trial.
In 1982, defendant was found guilty of
theft, a third degree felony, in violation of
U.C.A., 1953, §76-6-404. He appealed and
argued, inter alia, that the trial court erroneously permitted part of a written deposition
to be taken into the jury room. In State v.
Davis, 689 P.2d 5 (Utah 1984), this Court
affirmed the conviction .and ruled that defendant was precluded from asserting the error
on appeal in view of his failure to make a
seasonable objection at trial.
After defendant's petition for rehearing
was denied by this Court and the case was
remitted to the district court, defendant filed
an amended motion for a new trial based on
the jury's access to the written deposition.
The trial court denied this motion on the
ground that it was not timely. Defendant
appeals this ruling, alleging that he has now
made a proper challenge to the error in district court. For the same reason that the issue
was deemed waived on direct appeal (i.e.,
failure to make a proper and seasonable
objection), the trial court properly denied
defendant's motion for a new trial.
Defendant also requests that the sentencing
orders be declared invalid and that the case
be remanded for resentencing. However
questionable the procedures employed in
entering the formal order of sentence, the
matter is now moot since defendant has
served his sentence and has received a formal
termination of probation. As stated in Spain
v. Stewart, 639 P.2d 166, 168 (Utah 1981),
'Where the requested judicial relief can no
longer affect the rights of the litigants, the
case is moot and a court will normally refrain
from adjudicating it on the merits." The
exception alluded to is where there is a continuing and recurring controversy but, because
of the short time period for adjudication,
appellate review of the issue is effectively

For UTAH CODE ANNOTATIONS, see the second section of this issue.
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denied. Wickham v. Fisher, 629 P.2d 896 I
(Utah 1981). That is not the situation in the
instant case. Since all questions raised as to
sentencing orders are now moot, we will not
address the merits of defendant's arguments.
As a separate point on appeal, defendant
contends that the court's order of restitution
was invalid due to irregularities before and
during the restitution hearing. The record
contains no formal order of restitution. The
only record of that proceeding is an unsigned
minute entry which is not appealable. South
Salt Lake v. Burton, 33 Utah Adv. Rep. 27
(1986).
The issues raised in defendant's amended
motion for a new trial were addressed in the
direct appeal, and we affirm the trial court's
denial of that motion. We decline to address
any of the remaining issues (as to sentencing
and restitution), since those issues are not
properly before the Court.
So ordered.

For cumulative UTAH CODE ANNOTATIONS, see the second section of this issue.
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ADDENDUM B

EXHIBIT B

Dear Mr. Hutchinson,
In 1979 I became involved in a business matter with John Davis's father-in-law and
I also got acquainted with Mr. Davis. He being from Provo, I told him I was on a
property matter with Paul Tanner also of Provo who is a home builder. When I mentioned
his name Mr. Davis was very anxious to know all about our transaction and said he knew
Mr. Tanner very well and was trying to collect money for an account he had in Provo by
the name of Thorns Const. Ready Mix
Mr. Davis and myself went to see Mr. Tanner and he seemed surprised and wanted to
know how I had got to know him. Mr. Tanner told me how good Mr. Davis was that he had
been as was after him on several matters before.
Mr. Mascario (my partner) on this property deal then met with Mr. Davis and he explained to us his dealings he had previously with Mr. Tanner. We in turn hired him and
Mr. Davis started to work on our transaction. Being very complex it took quite a long
time to get things going on this deal and after a period of time Masscario got provoked
at me and Mr. Davis and didn't show up for some of the meetings we would have and those
he did attend h e always had to leave early before the meetings were over. So I told
Mr. Davis to continue that I had full trust in him.
Wcrlcinj with ^r. Davis and Mr Baus'thc: buyer of .:^.:d pr^r~rtis?0 fcr a year cr ir.or-.:,
the transaction was with in a few days of being closed. Mr. Masscario got mad at
Mr. Davis and myself and the next thing we knew he had other council to represent him.
Mr. Bert wyncott now Mr. Masscario's attorney asked Mr. Davis for a complete break
down of the transaction etc. which Mr. Davis personally done the closing of papers and
distributing of the monies. During this time Mr. Masscario asked me if the down-payment was made, I told him there had been to hang on for a few days. Within a short
period I was served with a summons from Mr. Wynoccott and Mr. Masscario. I called Mr.
Davis and he claimed he had been served also. Mr. Davis then came to my home. I told
him to be sure and answer the summons for me and he said "don't worry about it, I'll
take care of it because he had to fill his out also. I called him several times after
that and asked him if he had filled out the necessary papers for an answer to the
summons and he assured me he would take care of it. Mr. Davis never took care of
the summons I had received and he never intended to. Al.-short while later, I received
a call from my wife, she was crying. We had been served with papers for a siszure on
my home and other properties of mine which I have worked for all my life to accumlate.
I immediately called Mr. Davis and he assured me he would get it straightened out*
The next day we were informed that our checking account had a garinshement OIL it which
caused considerable problems plus embarrasment.
Things were worked out (temporally).
Three months go by Ifm calling Davis (long distance) constantly to get this transactio:
cleared up so we can all go about our business. Again we are served with another siezure
on my home, properties etc* I called Davis and he clamek that the Judges are changed
around and assured me once again not to worry that he knew what he was doing to please
trust him and to assure my wife that he would take care of everything.
As the weeks and months wore on with Mr. Davis doing nothing I was served with a
notice to appear at Attorney Rust's office for a deposition. At the deposition I
answered all the questions the best to my knowledge. I informed them that I did
not have any papers or documents that Mr. Davis kept everything.
On Mr. Davis's deposition the same day they asked him what the amount of the sale
was and he answered, then they asked him where the other $130,000.00 to $140,000.00
was he claimed he had. Mr. Davis refused to tell Mr. Rust where the money was. They
asked him U or 5 times more and he still refused to tell them anything.
As we left the attorney's office, I asked Mr. Davis why in the hell didn't he tell
them where the money was. I inturn asked him if indeed he did have the money. His
answer to me was "I.'rn not going to tell you or anyone else where it is.
A few days later there was for the 3rd time a siezure handed my wife on my home,
and property. Again I call him to ask him please get this straightened out and reminded him again that if he had just taken the interest and time to answer the summons
in the first place we wouldn't be going through all this. Again he said "trust me"

"dont worry I111 get it all straightened out" which he had no intention of doing*
Again we go to court and the Judge denies the judgement to be dismissed* A
few days later I was informed by mail that the best thing for me was to get other
council, as Mr* Davis would also have to get council for himself*
A few days later I received papers again from Mr* Rusts office for another deposition to be taken* At that point I hired Attorney Dale Potter to represent me*
On the day of the deposition Mr* Potter and I was informed that Mr* Davis had closed
his trust account many months before and that they were going to ask the bank where
Mr* Davis has his account to bring all photostat copys of Mr* Davis checks to the
hearing* Mr* Davis arrived shortly after the bank employee had delivered the photo
stat copies to Mr* Rust and not knowing the bank had already been there he informed
Mr* Rust that he was going to serve him with a restraining order on his trust and
bank account. He was a little late* With a few moments ij^again asked Mr* Davis where
the money was and again he answered n I donft have to tell you and Itm not going to.
We again started my deposition and again I answered all questions to the best of
my knowledge* We started to go over all of Mr* Davis checks that he had written*
You canft imagine what I felt when I seen those checks written by Mr* Davis to people
I didn't know or never heard about in my life. It was so hard for me to believe
that he had done this indecent thing to me jr even himself. At this point Mr. Davis
raised his voicr to Mr. Rust and sy attorney got up and told !ir. Davis that ve was
still taking Mr* Joseph's deposition and we see fraud and embezzlement here as we go •
over each and every check* There was approximately only U checks that I recognized
that had been written* Over a $100,000*00 Mr* Davis wrote for his own personal use.
All this time he had me believe that this money was in his trust account*
Right from the start when Chatillon (Mr. Baumfs Co) gave us the money, I told Davis
to be sure and distribute some money to Masscario and Shelby Taylor* I myself received
$38,000.00 in two seperate checks at different times. This money is what Davis
said he had in his trust account* I never authorized Mr* Davis to use any or pay
any of his own personal bills with the money he received* That money belonged to
Mr. Masscario, Mr* Shelby and myself.
Sir, this man has caused undo anguish to my wife and myself, he has hurt me in my
business, and has added extra expense for me to hire Mr. Potter. I ask the bar to take
the law to it!s full extent and have this man barred from practicing law anywhere in
or out of the state of Utah. He is a disgrace to his fellowmen, his community, and
his state.
I have worked hard all my life have bee n fair and honest with people* ItTs still
hard to believe that a man such as John Davis would jepordize his family, his job, etc.
for money that he spent that wasn*t his to spend.

1
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Utah§tateBar
Office of Stephen P. Hutchinson, Bar Counsel
425 EAST FIRST SOUTH / SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84111
TtfcplKtf* 1400-662-9054, 531-9077

January 12, 1982

John S. Davis
Attorney at Law
1068 Grand Circle
Provo, Utah
84 601

Dear John:
The enclosed complaint agains t y ou has been filed
with the Committee on Ethics and Discipline by
Charley Joseph. The activities complained of ma i ;
constitute violations of the Revised Rules of
Conduct of the Utah State Bar, to wit:
I

Canon, lf DR1-102 A (3)
Specification.: Engaging in illegal conduct
involving moral turpitude by converting trust
funds belonging 'to a client to your own use
or benefit,
janon 9# DR9-1Q2 B(3,4)
Specification: Failing to properly account
for client funds in your possession or to
pay said funds to your client as requested
by the client.

You are requested to submit a written response to
this complaint to this office within ten days. A
copy of your response will be provided to the complainant. We will then notify you of the date and
time set for consideration by the Committee.
y o u v i n receive a notice of this Committee meeting,
and will be given an opportunity to appear and make
a brief statement in support of, or in addition to,
your written response. Similarly, the complainant
will be permitted to appear and be heard. These
appearances are not required unless the Committee
separately communicates a specific request for you
to appear.

If you have any questions concerning this natter,
please call me at the telephone number above
shown.
Sincerely,

Stephen F. Hutchinson
Bar Counsel
SFH.sgl
Enclosure
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This Complaint

is IJIPMIJ with H U P Board of

Commissioners of the Utah State Bar by the undersigned as
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the Utah St a, t e B a i:.,
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The unprofessional conduct charged i n this complaint
ls

alleged

to

ux= a s

follows:

C0UN1I I
I
I
!

summer

Respondent undertook

2.

That, thereafter in June, 1979, Respondent collected
proceeds of the aforesaid transactions on behalf of
Mascaro and Joseph in an amount in excess of
$95,000, misappropriated the same and unlawfully
converted the same to his own use and benefit.

3*

That, thereafter Mr. Joseph and Respondent were
named defendants in a lawsuit initiated by Mr.
Mascaro and one Shelby Taylor; whereupon Respondent
assured Joseph that Respondent would fully undertake
the defense of the lawsuit on their joint behalf
and would file an answer therein for them as codefendants.

4.

That, notwithstanding, the said representation to
Joseph, Respondent intentionally and deliberately
defaulted in the lawsuit, allowing plaintiffs to
obtain a default judgment against himself and
Joseph in excess of $300,000. That the purpose of
this intentional default was to avoid litigation on
the merits, thus preventing or delaying discovery
proceedings which would have revealed the aforesaid
embezzlement, and to gain sufficient time with which
to divert or conceal Respondent's assets.

5.

That the aforesaid embezzlement and conversion, and
the subsequent manipulation of the judicial process
in order to conceal the same constitute violations
of Rule III, Section 2-5, Section 3; and Rule IV,
Canon 1, DR1-102 A (3),(4),(5) and (6), and Canon 9,
DR9-102 B (3) and (4) .

i

^ charged pursuant f'o the Mules of Conduct and

Discipline

the Utah state Bar.^

Pamela Greenwood
Chairman of Ethics and
Discipline Committee
Utah State Bar
425 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111

StepBetJ FT Hutchinson
Prosecutor
Utah State Bar
425 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah

ADDENDUM D

RUL2 11!
OATH Qf THE ATTORNEY
Tbm oath of an attorney, to be taken upon Admission to the Bar and
to be followed in practice by eacii member of the Utah State Bar,, is promulgated and prescribed as follows:
I Do

SOLSMKLT

Swxia:

I wSI support the Constitution of the United S'iotes and the Consti*
ration of the State of Utah* and that I wuL discharge the duties of
Attorney and Counselor at Law -uxih
'fideiiv/;
I wuL mamtam the respect due to Courts oj justice ana judicial
officers,
I wtZZ not cvnnsei or ruasvtam any suit or proceeding which shall
appear to me to be unjust nor any defense except mch as I believe to be
honestly debatable under the law of the land;
I wul employ for the purpose of mairttaimng the causes confided :o
me such means only as are consistent with truth and honor, and wul
never seek to mislead the Judge or jury by any artrficz or false .smt^ement
of fact or law,.
I tvi2 maintain the confidencz cmd preserve the secrets at rn-y ...<-:,
and wt2 accept no compensation in connection with his business -ixcept
from him or with his knowledge and approval;
I will abstain from ail offensive personality, and advance no fact
prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a &arty or witness* urdess required
by the justice of the cause with which I am charged;
I wiiZ never refect 'from any consideration pei zonal to nvself, the
cause of the defenseless or oppressed^ or delay any /nan's cause for lucre
or malice. So HELP ME GOD,

Cond^cf- Pr*S(nbed by /?u/e)
DR 1-101 Maintaining Integrity and Competence of the Legal Profession.
(A) A lawyer is subject to discipline if he has made a matenally false statement in, or ii he has deliberately failed to disclose a material fact
requested in connection with, has application for admission to the bar.
(B) A lawyer shall not further the application for admission to the bar of
another person known by him to be unqualified in respect to character,
education, or other relevant attribute
DB 1-102 Misconduct
(A) A lawyer shall not:
(1)' Violate a Disciplinary Ruie.
(2) Circumvent a Disciplinary Rule through actions of another.
(3) Engage in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude,
(4) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.
(5) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice.
(6) Engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness
to practice law.
DR 1-103 Disclosure of Information to Authorities.
(A) A lawyer possessing unprivileged knowledge of a violation of DR 1-102
shall report such knowledge to a tribunal or other authority empowered
to investigate or act upon such violation.
(B) A lawyer possessing unprivileged knowledge or evidence concerning
another lawyer or a judge shall reveal fully such knowledge or evidence
upon proper request of a tribunal or other authority empowered to
investigate or act upon the conduct of lawyers or judges.
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The attorney charged with unprofessional conduct in
this complaint is John Sheppard Davis,, who is an Attorney and
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COUNT I
1.

That during the summer of 1978, Respondent

undertook to represent the partnership of Joseph Mascaro and
Charley Joseph in certain real estate transactions regarding
real property in Utah County.
Z*

That, thereafter in June, 1979, Respondent

collected proceeds of the aforesaid transactions on behalf
of Mascaro and Joseph in an amount in excess of $95,000.
and misappropriated the same and unlawfully converted the
same to his own use and benefit.
3-

That, thereafter, Mr. Joseph and Respondent

were named defendants in a lawsuit initiated by Mr. Mascaro
and one Shelby Taylor, whereupon, Respondent assured Joseph
that Respondent would fully undertake the defense of the
lawsuit on their joint behalf and would file an answer
therein for them as codefendants.
4.

That, notwithstanding, the said representation

to Joseph, Respondent intentionally and deliberately
defaulted in the lawsuit, allowing plaintiffs to obtain a
default judgment against himself and Joseph in excess of
$300,000.

That the purpose of this intentional default was

to avoid litigation on the merits, thus preventing or
delaying discovery proceedings which would have revealed
the aforesaid embezzlement, and to gain sufficient time with
which to divert or conceal Respondents assets.

T'lhinii" l In,1
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COUNT I I

]

Respondent was convicted by a jury on one

count ot. the
2.

On November 26 # 1982, the -Judgment and
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WHEREFORE, t h e u n d e r s i g n e d , <; )i:i I )e!l:i a 1 f • : )£

t h e UTAH

STATE BAR pcays t h a t proceedings be taken h e r e i n a g a i n s t

the

attorney charged pursuant to the Rules of Discipline of the
Utah State Bar and that the Utah State Bar be awarded its
costs in bringing this action.

DATED t h i s

?^

day of AoAgCLi^

, 19 9A

,

Pairtela Greenwood
Chairman
Ethics and Discipline Committee

'cTUeffryPaoliiitiV
Prosecutor
Utah State Bar
425 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah

84111

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Formal Complaint was mailed certified mail
return receipt requested to John Sheppard Davis Attorney at
Law, 1068 Grand Circle, Provo, Utah 34601 this

day of

ADDENDUM F

23.

Conviction of crime.

of court.

Judgment of disbarment.

Duty of clerks

Except for good cause shown, upon conviction of an attorney

of a crime involving moral turpitude by any court, the Supreme Ccurwill enter a Judgment of Disbarment against the accused and will order
that the name of the accused be stricken from the roll of attorneys of
the court, and that he be precluded from practicing as such attorney in
ail the courts of this state. The clerk of a Utah state court in which
any such conviction is had must, within thirty days thereafter,
transmit to the Supreme Court a certified copy of the record of
conviction, which shall be conclusive evidence thereof.

An attorney sc

disbarred shall not be entitled to readmission until he satisfies the
requirements set forth in the Procedures of Discipline of the Utah
State Bar.
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ADDENDUM G

BEFORE THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS
OF THE UTAH STATE BAR
In Re:
JOHN S. DAVIS

)
)
)
)

ORDER
No. F-137

The Respondent filed a Motion to Sever and Dismiss the
First Count of the Formal Complaint filed by the Bar and a
Motion to Sever and Dismiss the Second Count of the Formal
Complaint.

Counsel to the Bar has responded to both motions

and the Respondent has filed a further supplement to his
response and a waiver of oral argument in the matter in order
to enable the consideration of the merits of the motions
without further need to schedule formal meetings of the
panel.
The Respondent has also filed a Motion for a Pretrial
Conference.
Upon receipt of the memoranda in support of and in
opposition to the motions filed by the Respondent, members of
the panel read and considered the claims of the Respondent in
the various motions.

After reviewing the files and records-

of the Bar, with respect to the initiation of the formal
complaint herein and after full deliberation by the panel,
it is hereby ordered:
1.

The motion of the Respondent

for a pre-trial

hearing is granted and the pre-trial hearing will be held as

scheduled by the parties prior to the date of any evidentiary
hearing in the matter.
2.

The hearing date of January 15 is hereby stricken

in accordance with the further terms of this order.
3.

The panel finds that a hearing panel of the Ethics

and Discipline Committee made a determination and directed
the Chairman of the Committee to file a formal complaint
as set forth more fully in the amended formal complaint,
Count 1, now on file herein.

The panel further finds that

the evidence before the panel indicates no evidence of bias
or prejudice against the Respondent.

The motion of the

Pespondent to sever and dismiss the first count of the formal
committee complaint is denied.
4.

The motion of the Pespondent to sever and dismiss

the second count of the complaint is taken under advisement
for a period of thirty

(30) days from the date hereof.

During the thirty (30) day period, the Bar counsel may or may
not refer the allegations of Count 2 to the Ethics and
Discipline Committee for the proceedings required by the
Rules of Discipline.

If Bar counsel determines that the

matter should not be pursued, Count 2 of the formal complaint
will be dismissed under the terms of this order.

If the

office of Bar counsel proceeds to refer Count 2 to the Ethics
and Discipline Committer, further proceedings herein will be
deferred until a determination is made by the Ethics and

Discipline Committee as to whether or not a formal complaint
will be filed based on the facts and circumstances underlying
Count 2 of the formal complaint•
In the event the matter is referred to the Committee and
the Ethics and Discipline Committee determines not to file a
formal complaint, Count 2 of the formal complaint hereir
shall be dismissed and the panel shall proceed promptly to
hear the allegations of Count

1.

If the Ethics and

Discipline Committee determines to direct the filing of a
formal complaint after the required proceedings before the
Ethics and Discipline Committee, Bar counsel may recruest that
the formal complaint issued may be consolidated herein for
hearing.
This matter will be reconsidered in 30 days without
further hearing to determine whether proceedings have or have
not been
Committee•

initiated

before

the Ethics

and

Discipline

If proceedings have not been initiated, a hearing

date will be set for a pre-hearing conference and a hearing
on the facts and circumstances underlying Count 1 of the
formal complaint on file.
DATED this 31st day of January 1985.

GEBALI7 H.^JfeHOPN
Chaiqmapx^ J

ADDENDUM H

C. Jeffry Paoletti
Bar Counsel
Utah State Bar
425 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah

84111

BEFORE THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS
OF THE UTAH STATE BAR

In Re:

STIPULATION

JOHN S. DAVIS

F-190

It. is hereby stipulated and agreed between
C. Jeffry Paoletti, Bar Counsel, and John S. Davis,
Respondent that the Complaint filed in the above
styled matter may be dismissed, without prejudice.
Respondent will be making a presentation before
Screening Panel "D,f of the Ethics and Discipline Comm
on Thursday, April 25, 1985 regarding the issuance
of a Formal Complaint and, therefore, the present
complaint may be dismissed without prejudice*
DATED this

?'<& day of

X^l- f
;r

C. Jeffry Paoletti
Bar Counsel

Jpfin S. Davis
"Respondent
Pro Se

, 1985.

C. Jeffry Paoletti
Bar Counsel
Utah State Bar
425 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah

84111

BEFORE THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS
OF THE UTAH STATE BAR

In Re:

ORDER

JOHN S. DAVIS

F-190

Based on the stipulation of the parties in
the above-styled matter, Respondent's Motion to
Quash is granted and the Formal Committee Complaint
on file is hereby dismissed, without prejudice.

DATED this

/ *5~ day of

fl

0/h

/

1985,

HEARING COMMITTEE PANEL

BY
Gerald H.
Cha irman

ADDENDUM I

BEFORE THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS
OF THE UTAH STATE BAR

IN RE:

COMPLAINT

JOHN S. DAVIS

F-198

The attorney charged with unprofessional conduct
in this complaint is John S. Davis, who is an Attorney
and Counselor in the State of Utah, and a member
of the Utah State Bar, presently temporarily suspended,
residing in the City of Provo, County of Utah,
State of Utah, and whose address according to the
records of the Executive Director of the Utah State
Bar is, 1068 No. Grand Circle, Provo, Utah 84604.
II
This complaint is filed with the Board of
Commissioners of the Utah State Bar by the undersigned
as the regularly appointed Ethics and Discipline
Committee of the Utah State Bar.
Ill
The unprofessional conduct charged in this
Complaint is alleged to be as follows:
1. Respondent was convicted by a jury on one
count of theft. Attached hereto is a copy of the

Complaint
John S. Davis
F-190
Page 2

information and jury verdict and incorporated by
reference and marked Exhibit A,
2.

On November 26, 1982, Respondent was sentenced

based on the verdict.

Attached hereto are copies of

the minute entries reflecting the conviction and sentencing
which are incorporated herein and marked Exhibit B.
3,

The count of theft of which Respondent was

convicted is a felony in the second degree as defined
by 76-6-404 and 76-6-412(1)(a)(i), Utah Code
Annotated (1953 as amended).

The trial judge reduced

the offense for which Respondent was convicted to a
third degree felony,
4.

Respondent appealed his conviction to the

Utah Supreme Court,

The Court, by its decision filed

June 25, 1984, affirmed Respondent's conviction.
Attached hereto is a copy of the decision of the Utah
Supreme Court, incorporated herein and marked Exhibit C.
5,

The conduct of Respondent is in violation

of Rule II, Section 4, and Canon 1, DR 1-102(A)(4) of
the Revised Rules of Professional Conduct of the Utah
State Bar; Rule II (a), Rules of Discipline of the Utah
State Bar; and paragraph 32, Rules for Integration and
Management of the Utah State Bar.
WHEREFORE, the undersigned, on behalf of the
UTAH STATE BAR prays that proceedings be taken herein
against the attorney charged pursuant to the Rules
of Discipline of the Utah State Bar and that the Utah
State Bar be awarded its costs in bringing this action.

Complaint
John S. Davis
F-190
Page 3

:2ir_

D 1TED th. i s

dav of

1985,

Pamela T. Green w o o d
Chairman
Ethics and Discipline Committee

C-i

Yc^Zkr

C. Jef
aoivv.
Prosecutor
Utah State Bar
425 East 100 South
Salt Lake C i t y , U t a 1:

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Formal Complaint was mailed certified
mail return receipt requested t o J o hn S• Davis,
Attorney at Law, 1068 No. Grand Circle, Provo, Utah
84601, this ^Z^f
day of
1985,
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The Respondent insisted that the prior rules of discipline
be used for the hearing and all subsequent proceedings.
hearing

the

arguments

of counsel

and

reviewing

the

After

material

documents, the Panel finds that no difference exists between the
Rules

and

the

Procedures

adverse

to

the

Respondent;

if the

Respondent calls the attention of the Panel to a matter where an
adverse conflict may exist, the Panel will rule on the matter and
the appropriate rules during the hearing.
The Panel will apply the Procedures of Discipline of the
Utah State Bar adopted September 25, 1985 to the hearing except
as provided more specifically above.
The Respondent moved for the exclusion of witnesses to be
heard by the Panel from the hearing room.

The exclusionary rule

was invoked and each party was asked to state the name of all
witnesses to be called.
stand and be sworn.
parties as witnesses:

The Panel instructed the witnesses to

The following persons were named by the
Mr. Randall Hall, Mr. Jeff Paoletti and

Mr. Charlie Joseph were sworn by the reporter and admonished not
to discuss their testimony with each other or discuss the subject
matter of the hearing.
The Respondent objected to counsel for Mr. Joseph remaining
during the hearing. Under the public hearing provisions under
which the Hearing is conducted, Mr. Tesch was allowed to remain
in the room but was admonished while the witnesses were leaving.
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s t a t e me n t s

a r gi ime n t =

o r ofche r wi t n e s s e s •
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Panel

confirmed

that

the hearing was going

C o i i n t 11 : f t h e amended

:r

c omp1aint

forward only

in the consolidated

11: i• EE

under
matters

F-13 7 and J ' 198 which a.I leges that the Respondent was convicted
of the crime of theft in the second degree, that the trial judge

of Count 11 alleges that the conduct of the Respondent is i n violation of Rti le 11 , Sect I on t f 2 ) and Cannon 1 , E -r 1 • ] 0 2 f S ) (4) ,
o f t h e R e v i s e d R u 1 e s o f P r o f e s s i o n a 1 C o n d u c t o f t h e tJ !:::: a h S t a t e
B a r , R u l e I I (a) , Rti les of Discipline of the Utah State Par; and

Utah State Bar
The Respondent reserved the right to make an opening stater
Counsel for the Bar reviewed the record and specifically the
answer o f the Re spondent t< ::> the amended comp 1 a int.

The Respon-

den t: objected to the characterization of his answer i n paragraph
2 of the second defense as an admission that he was sentenced on
Nc v ernt er 2 6

1 9 8:2

Counsel f' iri: the Bar offered proposed Exhibits 1, 2 and 3 as
evidence.

The Respondent examined the proposed exhibits and the

R e sp o n d eiI t Ila ; i iig

i : , < :::! • :: b j e c t: i o i i, E x h i b :i 1: I T c: s

admitted and received in evidence•

1

2 = , i: i ::! 3

Exhibit No, 4 was then marked and offered as an exhibit
which is the transcript and record on appeal to the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah in the case of State v. Davis 689 P. 2d 5
(Utah

1984).

exhibit and

The

Respondent

requested

the Panel proposed

that

time

counsel

to

examine

the

for the parties

disclose all their proposed exhibits to each other, have them
numbered, organized and examined by counsel during a recess.
Upon

resuming

the

hearing,

counsel

for

the Bar

offered

proposed Exhibit No. 4 consisting of subparts 4a, 4b, 4c and 4d.
Mr, Davis objected on the grounds that the exhibit is irrelevant.
The panel ruled that the exhibit would be received into evidence,
reserving to the panel the discretion to determine the relevancy
and weight of the evidence; Exhibit No. 4 was admitted.
Proposed Exhibit No. 5 was marked and offered; the Respondent offered

the same objection

as to relevancy

to proposed

Exhibit No. 5 and the Panel ruled that the exhibit would be
received

subject to the same reservation of discretion as to

relevancy and weight.
Counsel
witness.

for

Prior

the Bar then

called

to the examination

Mr. Randall

Hall as a

of Mr. Hall, Bar Counsel

requested that the panel rule that based on the exhibits the
Respondent has been convicted of a crime as charged in Count II
of the Amended Complaint.
After hearing the arguments of counsel and examining the
exhibits, the panel ruled that the Bar had sustained its burden

of proof bv clear and rnnvinrl

c-:nv: --e

*

_-_ „ - j

:: *

::me..

,b.

* rrrnctior. was entered.

r

Davis

- . tu;,* ..

(

•

^

G : J --

ssufb

.rtsei.u/

-

•=:

-

the Pane , .
of

^^:* *--

reservation

~* -esixncent 3 no renewal

- Mr. Ha.

P r o p o s e Fy^ *~

« .
j

**

^

T*-*-.^

. i ^ ' u ^ d by Counsel f"
*- -

^>° Bar,.

: i r e r ^ : and

--- ~ f i r * s t - ; ^ r

a din i I,

Mr, Hproposed

«- *

-examined ry '\:

Exnibx*.

j ection.

'Proposed

-

.,£" - ^rfered
-'adence *^ ~u - -

xeceiv"
Exhibi t

] was o ffered

identification by the witness and received

by Mr. Davis
ii i evidence

ob-

after

without

ob jec ti 01 i.
Examination o f the witness was concluded
Members

of the panel

asked

w i t n e s s ; ; a s e x c u s e d.

the witness

by the parties.

certain

questions the

• • '•

Counsel for the Bar then informed the Court that the Bar did
no t

i n t e n d t o z: a ] ] a n} f i 11 t h e r w i t n e s s e s

h o we ve r spec: f :i c n • ::> t i c e

should be taken of the case of state vs. Davis,
Counse;

:-r

the Bar having

rested,

the Respondent was

r

: - •-• ?esp<. ncent m.oved for dismissal of the complaint on the

basis oi Luc provisions

UL

/U-J-402(2)

(b) .

After

hearing the

arguments of counsel, examining the statute, the exhibits and
after considering additional grounds for the Motion to Dismiss as
stated by the Petitioner that the Bar had failed to sustain its
burden of proof on the remainder of the charges in Count II, the
Respondent's motions to dismiss were denied.
The Respondent made an opening statement in which he renewed
the pre-trial motions heard by the Panel on prior occasions.
The

Respondent

called

Jeff

Paoletti

as

a witness:

Paoletti was seated and examined by the Respondent.

Mr.

After the

examination of the Respondent, Counsel for the Bar declined to
cross-examine Mr. Paoletti.
The

Respondent

called

Mr. Charlie

Joseph

as

a witness.

Counsel for Mr. Joseph requested an opportunity to consult with
Bar counsel with
Joseph.

respect .to protective matters

regarding Mr.

The Panel briefly recessed and reconvened the hearing

for further proceedings.
Counsel for the Bar stated a continuing objection to the
testimony of Mr. Joseph as being irrelevant to the issues defined
by the Respondent during his opening statement and on the basis
that the Respondent was attempting to relitigate the issue of
guilt or innocence in the criminal matter.

After hearing the

arguments of counsel, the objection of Bar Counsel was overruled
and

the

Respondent

was

permitted

to proceed

to

examine Mr.

Charlie Joseph based on Rule 23 of the Rules of Integration and
Management of the Utah State Bar and the case of In Re:
Strong 616 P.2d, 583 (Utah 1980).

Kline D.

Tl>. Respondent, then e x a m i n e d M i . J o s e p h

'Iter e x a m i n a t i o n

by f-he R e s p o n d e n t , t h e w i t n e s s w a s c r o s s - e x a m i n e d b v c o u n s e l f o r
th-

r

v ' , (" • i • " '-,•-"' I T M if i '

»,

I1 ' M P S P ]

f

<• T

he Bar

tl le

R e s p o n d e n t e x a m i n e d M i , J o s e p h based on issues r a i s e d during tl: le
cross-examination
q uesti :)i: is

lvp p T i c o u n s e l ,

I ii I h

and1 t he

w1 Lness

t e s t imon y e 1 i c i t e d b y

t he

The Panel

Pa ne1 b e

directed

Respondent
st ri c k e n

certain

moved

that t h e

o r i n t he

a 11 e r-

n a t i T r i= •, 1 : h = , it , 1 i » b e • g :i < r e i i = , i: I c: • p p c • r 11 11 i i t } t • :: f i i r t 1: l e i: e: ;: a in i r
witness,
t he

T h e Responden t received

en t i re

de c I s i on

Is

re-examine
the

transcript

w oi3 3 d

r e nd e re d

Mr

!"' 1 i e

•Joseph,

assurance

be

Thereafter

a i: i < :::! r e v I ewe d

i: e a 3

P aiie I
Mr«

from,, t h e Panel

a J 1 owed
• J oseph

t, 11 M
was

that

be fo re

H e s p i: ride i I t
excused

from

I n t r od u c e

one

proceedings.
"I h e R e s p o n d e n t

mor-;:
ac !i

d o cu me n t
t'ipi'i,

Fourth

i n d i c a t e d t ha t

wh i ch

couns e ]

'Hi*1 ilricuiTiei'i 1 i '

District

Court

by

i pin
f-he

for

he
t he

I n t end ed t o
Ba r

stipulated

' eril'Hin H report" prepain-'ii
Division

of

Aduj t-

co u I d

be

(MI I I »

Probation

and

Parole*
T he

Re s p o i ide n t

was adequately

1 nd i c a t e d t ha t

explained

his

v e r s i on o f

t he

I n the report • ::)f the DIvision

i nc i dent

o f Adu 1 f

P r o b a t i o n a n d P a r o 1 e a n d t h e r e f o r e 1 :i. e w o i :i 1 d i i c • ( : 1: e s t i f }
admission c f the stipulated e x h i b i t , the Respondent

? ft ^ •

rested•

Counsel for the Bar made a ^losing s t a t e m e n t , citi rig certain
cases

I in I 111 i i" i < i i nni

Upon the c o n c l u s i o n

11 s < >'

I in

o f t h e closing

:,i I-H >, i i i

statement

. : s : .f tl: le f 'ai iel •

o f Counsel

for the

Bar, Mr. Davis was invited to make a closing statement.

During

the closing statement by Mr. Davis, certain questions were asked
by the Panel to clarify the issues Mr. Davis felt were relevant
for the Panel's consideration.
The Respondent was permitted to introduce certain additional
illustrative exhibits which were prepared by him, subject to the
objection of Bar Counsel as to the foundation for the exhibits.
After the closing statements of the parties, a spontaneous
statement was made on the record by Carol B. Davis, the wife of
the Respondent over the objection of Bar Counsel.

Mrs. Davis was

not sworn, however, the Panel permitted the statement by Mrs.
Davis.
At 6:56 p.m. the record was closed after having received all
exhibits, evidence and statements of counsel.
Based upon the exhibits, testimony and all of the evidence,
the Panel makes the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Respondent is a member of the Utah State Bar and is

the same person as the Defendant in the case of The State of Utah
vs. John Shepard Davis, 689 P.2d 5 (Utah 1984) .
2.

The Respondent was convicted of the crime of theft, a

felony in the second degree and sentenced by the Court pursuant
to the discretion of the District Court, to a sentence for theft,
a felony in the third degree.

3. '
appeali-'il

The
hi

sentence
I In

and

conviction

'""up r < MUM iVmrh

i"if

of

!!!• -\\\

the

Respondent

i n»™ 1 tin--

were

V • i ? i in r t

Hie

j u r y a, n d t r i a 1 c o u r f: we i: e a, £ f i rme d •
4•

The Respond e n t

a ,:n„ d d e c e i t £ i :i ] 1 : • >

the property

e ngage d i r „ c onduc t

a p f:: i: • ::) p i: i a t ,:i i: l g

of clients without

f i 11 i ::i s

their

wh i c h wa s d i s ho n e s t

t : • 1: i i s

:: • ; i i i i s = •

' I: 3 :i : • I: „ • • = :i : •

consent, by failing

t , :»

d i s c 1 o s e t! ::i) t h e ::: ,1 i e n t t h e d i s b u r s e m e „n, t o f t h e c 1 i e n t' s fun d s a n d
attempting

to prevent

the cl lent

from, the discovery

o f the

disbursement of funds and by the use of such funds for personal
expenditures•
5.
tke

The Respondent introduced no evidence in mitigation of

c o n v i c t i o n o f th,e£t or to b e c o n s i d e r e d

for the purpose of

t h e s e oroceedipT<= » n d t h e c l a i m s i n, the complaints herein,,
Eased

•>• foregoing Findings of Fact, the Panel makes the

i '

i i s a n, • ::i R e c o m m e i i d a, t „:i • ::> n :
1.

1- r

*i , m e

'

v: *-*" +• i - ~

^espondent

t
*

• :::),£ theft

and the circumstances
const„i„tute

11 „ 11:: e 11: l e ,R„ e s p o i i d e :i I t:
"- ' -

conduct,

of the c c n -

i n v o .1 vi n„g m o r a 1

,:i o 1 a t e d, R i 11 e 2 , S e c t i • ::> i: i • I

?e* _ sed Rules of Professional Conduct

of the I Jtal i

State Bar.
2•

The convic tion o f tl :i„e De f endant o f ti le ::r ime

o f the ft

constitutes a v i o 1 a t i o n o f ,Ru 1 e 2 (a,) o f t h e ,R„u„1„e s o f D I, scI,p 11 n,e
c

i,e Uta h St:a, t e

B EII

,:i i i

tl la t

ti l s • :::::::i: :i me

;- a s

a

• :ri: i m< * i n o„] vi i i g

mo r a 1 t u r p i t u d e .

3.

The Respondent is subject to a ji idgment- of disbarment

p u r s u a n t t c P a r a g r a p 1 i, 2 3 • J f 1 1 i e „R u 1 e s f : • i: I n t e g r a t i o n a n d M a, n a g e -

ment of the Utah State Bar having been convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude.
4.

The

Respondent

should

be

disbarred

and

his

name

stricken from the register of attorneys in the State of Utah*
5.

No mitigating circumstances exist to provide a basis

for any sanction other than disbarment.

DATED this

/ ff day of

AJ^(J£&J &lfi—

, 1986.

ADDENDUM K

(t )

i ::: smpla-i ria nt , sha 1 ] ha ^ re the .1:11 :jht to a ppea r before the

d i s c i p l i n a r y panel p e r s o n a l l y • o r through a designated r e p r e s e n t a t i v e to
make a statement in support of h is or her complaint or in opposition to
the matters presented by the attorney aga I n s t w 1: 10m : 'ompla I i :i t I :ia s been
made.

This shall not Include direct confrontation of the parties

ass specif I'M J. I '/ '^i

the
RULE VII

DISCIPLINE AND SANCTIONS
(a)

Disbarment.

Disbarment shall result in the revocatun JI: a.:

attorney's license to practice law, and in the removal of the disbarred
a t torney fr IJIII

i: ol I • :: f a t tor ney s

!

of

tlni e

iiipi i-snie i ' u i r HI mi- hrw L ZV>1

engage in the practice of law in the State of Utah,

'The Supreme Court

ha s exc] i i si ve p< swei • to 3rd er disbarment.
(b)

Suspension.

Suspension of an attorney shall remove said

individua 1 as a member < i»f the Bar o I: the Supreme Coi irt in good standing
iiid shall ranaei: liuiiri ",;u: liei,, nicdpalile ..iiiKi mujud Li 11 e < ;1 i' o iji:aor i ,;i"; L^<i
i n the State of Utah during the period of suspension,,
?

n i s p e n n ^ n iniy ^a *"^ \\\\f f" i inri f r nme Ie°s

lun

WM

The period of
H-IIS

Supreme Court has e x c l u s i v e p o w e r s to oraei s u s p e n s i o n .
s u s p e n s i o n --.

^'u^

iwr^M'n.
Any tei/m of

-** stayed b y hhe Supreme Court conditioned on M-p
" • ' aw • «Mli

suspended ~
the- staye : -'isziensi

-.'ML.-HJI

I JLJIKI

a\ 1 .. iidii j

IK.J

active member of the Utan State Bar who

or
is

minted bv the R o a M t*o TUf>"2i:vi ;w-} hhe
suspendec ±\~ .. ~*~ .**u
with the u^-u-uo .
(i) I
the Committee

assure that the suspended attorney complies

-,-'~* tions of the stayed suspension.
.
;

ispension

I Ipoi I p >etiti^ on c .f the Boa r i, or of

le consent of the Board) filed with the

Supreme Court, or on it own motion, the Supreme Court may issue ar
interim order suspending an attorney from the practice of law or
imposing temporary conditions of probation pending a final
determination in any disciplinary proceeding.

The Supreme Court

shall have exclusive power to place an attorney on interim
suspension.

If such a petition of the Board is filed prior to,

concurrently with, or subsequent to the filing of its Findings,
Conclusions, and Recommendation with the Supreme Court in a
disciplinary case, such petition shall be supported by affidavits
and exhibits demonstrating that the attorney has been convicted of
a crime involving moral turpitude, or is causing great harm to the
public and/or a client or clients pending final disp&sition of the
disciplinary proceeding.
(2)

In the event of a petition for interim suspension, the

Board shall have the burden of proof that the relief sought shculc
be granted in whole or in part.
(3)

Any order of temporary suspension shall preclude the

attorney form accepting new cases, but shall not preclude him frcr
continuing to represent existing clients during the first 3 0 days
after the effective date of the temporary order; provided that an:
fees tendered to such attorney for services performed during the
30-day period shall be deposited in a trust fund from which
withdrawals may be made only in accordance with restrictions
imposed by the Supreme Court.
(4)

A temporary suspension order which restricts the

attorney from maintaining an account against which the attorney
may make withdrawals, shall serve as a injunction to prevent the

p i VITIP! 11, •, h hf-reon exc^'")i
with r e s t r i c t : :r 5

(5)

, n i^cordance

• "sed iy tine supreme Com t

The Supreme Court shall have exclusive power to

terminate an I literim si ispensi on.
(c)

Probation

Probation may be imposed only in those cases i : i

wliu.li !, !iet>,'" i i I J U ie likelihood f'haf": Uhe -i t: i- iniey i"'ii nr'.iLh.if. i. ''i" - :i:
harm the public during the period of probation and i',;be conditions of
probat i on ca n 1:: =s a dequately si ipervised

The Board may appoint a n

active member :i)f: t i n * Utah Sta te Bar who is I n good s tai iding to
s" ipervise the a ttorney a n d to assure that t h e attorney fulfills the
conditions • :)f the p i: oh a t i on.
Probation shall be imposed for a specified period not in excess

o:

conditions of the probation shalJ be s tipulated in writing and may onl'
be imposed b^ ;r the Supreme Court.
Probation may be terminated upon 1 ihe fi ] I rig of 3 n affida y i t J ov the
r sspondent that he has complied w i t h the conditions of probation and a;
aff Ida"'!

o\ ' ii" pi iiJdi'i in'., luyei / umin ilin \- v if i M HI I * n i ni-jer

necessary.
If the probation -Mi:ervisor fails t-o file an affidavit,

::=

Counsel shou.J investigate t;; determine whethti Hie L (=bp«. udej
be fully reinstated

ir
-.i« u ,

6a i: Counsel may recommend that the respondent be

ft i liy r e-.ns :a I" ••• I Mill i In pet* 'id if rrnh.iM ni IJ

r a

f nd' j 1 f i i rpt'ioc

not t:i exceed two years or that other discipline be ,i]ipn:y I
(dj

i il i"1 Peorimand.

m a y b e public 1/ i eprimanc id
impose the reprimand,

For unprofessional conduct, nn -ar^orney
I lie supreme J-art has e x z l i s r f2

OWIJI

Such shall be accomplished in writing with the

;

ADDENDUM L

RULE XII
DISCIPLINARY HEARING BEFORE BOARD
(b)

Evidence.

The rules of evidence and procedure applicable to

the conduct of non-jury civil trials in the District Courts of the
State of Utah shall govern the hearing on a Formal Committee Complaint.
A verbatim recording shall be maintained by electronic and/or
stenographic means.

